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Introduction 
 
 
Encryption under Threat 
As states across the globe weaken cyber-security, Germany should oppose the trend 
Matthias Schulze 
An inadvertent worldwide alliance against encryption is emerging, as Western democ-
racies join authoritarian regimes in weakening communication encryption and ex-
ploiting spyware. This accelerating global trend undermines efforts to enhance cyber-
security. Germany should oppose such developments and intensify its efforts to 
champion encryption. This will also mean finding alternative instruments to keep 
terrorism suspects under surveillance without degrading the software security of the 
entire population. 
 
Encryption technologies are a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, encryption plays 
a vital role in the digital age, for example 
in online banking (SSL/TLS), secure web 
surfing (HTTPS) and the handling of sensi-
tive data. It offers substantial protections 
against cyber-crime and hostile intelligence 
services. On the other hand, criminals can 
also use encryption to communicate be-
yond the reach of law enforcement. That 
dilemma forms the heart of a political 
debate that has continued for more than 
two decades. In the 1990s Washington con-
sidered banning encryption and requiring 
processor chips to be fitted with a backdoor 
permitting US authorities to eavesdrop 
encrypted communications (“Crypto 
Wars”). In the end, civil society resistance – 
together with technical obstacles – 
produced a broad consensus that more 
encryption made the digital world a safer 
place. 
That consensus now appears to be crum-
bling. Whether driven by fear of terrorism 
or a wish to enforce censorship, more and 
more states are seeking ways to bypass en-
cryption, for example by exploiting soft-
ware vulnerabilities. As democratic states 
begin following authoritarian regimes 
down that road, there is a risk of this be-
coming the new international norm. Ger-
many should oppose this trend, as software 
vulnerabilities endanger cyber-security for 
the population at large and encourage 
abuse, while the gains for counter-terrorism 
are limited. 
China and Russia 
In January 2017 Beijing introduced a fed-
eral licence requirement for Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) software. About 90 million 
Chinese use VPN clients to encrypt their 
entire internet communication – and evade 
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their government’s internet surveillance 
and censorship infrastructure (the “Great 
Firewall”). Existing VPNs also allow users 
to access uncensored Western sources such 
as Wikipedia. State-licensed VPN services, 
however, would include the very surveil-
lance and censorship filters that users are 
seeking to avoid. The new policy includes 
heavy fines for violations. Western com-
panies operating in China have recently 
been required to switch to Chinese VPNs. 
Bowing to Chinese pressure, Apple has 
removed Western VPN clients from its 
Chinese iOS App Store. 
Similar initiatives to bring VPN clients 
under state control exist in in Iran, Syria 
and most recently in Russia. The Russian 
Duma passed legislation in July 2017 for-
bidding the use of the Tor anonymisation 
network and VPN clients that fail to imple-
ment state censorship and internet sur-
veillance (SORM-II). A year earlier, in July 
2016, Russia adopted anti-terror legislation 
with provisions including expanded data 
retention and an obligation to grant the 
state backdoor access to encrypted services. 
This forces operators like Telegram and 
WhatsApp to hand encryption keys to the 
Russian authorities or to provide alter-
native access to their encrypted content. 
United Kingdom, Australia, United 
States 
The imposition of such drastic measures is 
not confined to authoritarian regimes. The 
British Investigatory Powers Act of 2016 
contains provisions for state-mandated 
encryption and requires UK-based internet 
service providers to remove encryption on 
request. Companies can also be forced to 
create backdoors to give state agencies 
clandestine access, install eavesdropping 
software on their customers’ equipment or 
block security updates. It is, however, un-
clear how London intends to make foreign 
companies comply with these require-
ments, which is why the measures have 
not yet been implemented. Undeterred by 
such difficulties, Australia is currently 
planning very similar legislation. The latest 
draft would allow law enforcement to force 
WhatsApp and other providers to provide 
access to encrypted communications. 
In the United States the – as yet unenact-
ed – Burr-Feinstein Encryption Bill of 2016 
would require companies to deliberately 
weaken the (cyber)security of their products 
in order to make it easier for the authori-
ties to access encrypted communications. 
Companies could also be compelled by 
court order to decrypt data for the authori-
ties. The bill fulfils the FBI’s demand to 
weaken the security mechanisms in the 
Apple iOS operating system, after it failed 
to access the encrypted iPhone of the 2016 
San Bernardino attacker. 
All these efforts must be seen in the 
context of an initiative by the “Five Eyes” 
intelligence alliance (United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zea-
land). Their objective is to establish a global 
regime that excludes terrorists from using 
encrypted communication. Given that this 
initiative aligns with Chinese and Russian 
interests, it advances a global norm-setting 
process in cyberspace. A Five Eyes commu-
niqué of June 2017 proposes joint measures 
to enable legal access to encrypted commu-
nications. Although they say they want to 
cooperate with the IT industry, the states 
concerned are ignoring practical problems. 
In the past companies like Apple, Google 
and Microsoft have repeatedly resisted ef-
forts to deliberately weaken their products. 
Germany 
Germany’s position is contradictory. Ber-
lin’s cyber-security strategy of 2016 em-
phasises the benefits of encryption in areas 
such as digital public services and e-com-
merce (“security through encryption”), but 
also points to the dangers (“security despite 
encryption”). The Digital Agenda of 2014 
even talks of making Germany the global 
leader in encryption. Agencies like the Fed-
eral Office for Information Security have 
long been warning of the dangers posed by 
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state backdoors and weakening encryption 
for law enforcement purposes. 
However there are now signs of Germany 
walking back its strong cyber-security line. 
One indication is the new policing legisla-
tion of June 2017, which permits the use of 
surveillance software on devices like smart-
phones, another the founding of a dedicat-
ed agency to develop the requisite IT tools 
(ZITiS). In this approach the encryption 
software remains untouched, and instead 
the state spyware eavesdrops communica-
tion before it is encrypted on the device. 
National security versus 
cyber-security 
Hacking smartphones comes at a cost. It 
touches not only on questions of the right 
to privacy, which is protected under Article 
10 of the German Basic Law, and the right 
to confidentiality of information systems 
formulated by the German Constitutional 
Court in 2008, but also erodes the overall 
standard of cyber-security. 
Consensus exists within the global IT 
community that it is technically impossible 
to provide exclusive access for law enforce-
ment without weakening the overall secu-
rity of products. With current encryption 
procedures only authorised users (sender 
and recipient) can decrypt messages, and 
not third parties (hackers, authorities). So 
encryption not only ensures that the com-
munication can be neither eavesdropped 
nor manipulated in transit (confidentiality 
and integrity), but also that the communi-
cation partners are actually those they ap-
pear to be (authenticity). The latest meth-
ods use session keys (“forward secrecy”) or 
keys generated on a secure chip within the 
customer’s device to make it technically 
impossible for the ISP to hand keys to the 
authorities or decrypt client communica-
tion themselves. 
In such cases it is technically possible to 
monitor communication only before en-
cryption. The required hacking or the use 
of special malware/spyware, depend in turn 
on software vulnerabilities to weaken or 
bypass the device’s security mechanisms. 
But deliberately created or tolerated vul-
nerabilities will also be exploited by cyber-
criminals and hostile intelligence services. 
That is the dilemma: Either we weaken 
cyber-security in order to monitor terrorism 
suspects, and increase the risk of hacking 
and data theft. Or we accept the risk that 
certain criminals will no longer be so easy 
to keep under surveillance. Hacking and 
cyber-crime cause immense harm, esti-
mated at up to $500 billion annually. That 
is what led James Clapper, former United 
States Director of National Intelligence, 
to insist that cyber-security – rather than 
terrorism – is now the leading national 
security threat. 
So the costs of weakening software 
security are high, while the benefits tend 
to be small. Terrorists generally avoid 
services that are open to state eavesdrop-
ping. Once a service is known to have been 
compromised (like Skype since 2008), they 
switch to other channels. Besides “burner” 
phones and smartphones with multiple 
SIM cards (to run multiple WhatsApp and 
Telegram accounts), the Islamic State rec-
ommends using leave-no-trace operating 
systems like Tails to defend against spy-
ware. The likely outcome of mandated 
vulnerabilities in smartphone software is 
that criminals will switch to other, more 
secure technologies while the general 
public’s smartphones remain deliberately 
insecure. That would be reckless in light of 
the rise in cyber-security incidents and the 
growing numbers of affected users. The 
recent WannaCry ransomware attack af-
fected hundreds of thousands of computers 
worldwide, while in Mexico Pegasus spy-
ware was discovered on the smartphones of 
numerous journalists, lawyers and activists. 
Recent developments like the Internet 
of Things and the trend to mobile working 
are changing the role of the smartphone, 
as they take on growing everyday control 
functions: Today, aside from communica-
tion, they administer bank accounts and 
digital wallets, open electronic locks and 
play a crucial part in cyber-security, for 
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example for two-factor authentication of 
online services. Compromising smart-
phones with spyware that can potentially 
be exploited by hackers and intelligence 
services undermines the security of all the 
associated services. And then there is the 
problem of the message this sends: If liberal 
democracies weaken software and encryp-
tion to fight terrorism, this will legitimise 
similar practices in authoritarian states. 
Solutions 
In light of the global initiatives by intelli-
gence services and repressive regimes, Ger-
many should advocate even more deter-
minedly for secure software and encryp-
tion. At the same time alliances with other 
democratic EU states need to be strength-
ened, in order to stem the global trend 
against encryption. And instead of state-
mandated software vulnerabilities under-
mining broader efforts to improve cyber-
security, research needs to be put into 
developing new investigatory technologies 
and strategies. 
An independent commission should 
assess how serious the problem of uncrack-
able encryption actually is. Calls for greater 
powers for the state are generally based 
only on anecdotal evidence, and there is in 
fact little in the way of reliable data con-
cerning the number of investigations drop-
ped on account of an inability to eavesdrop 
smartphone communication. Moreover, 
even in the known cases it is also often 
unclear whether alternative channels for 
accessing communication data might not 
have been available. 
Such a commission could also take up 
the issue of developing new policing strate-
gies. Since 2001 states have concentrated 
on technical surveillance capacities while 
in many cases steadily cutting back on staff. 
The extent to which more labour-intensive 
methods would be legal and useful needs to 
be considered. Cyber-crime investigations 
in the darknet are a good example. Illegal 
anonymous markets like Hansa and 
AlphaBay have been successfully closed 
down after their operators made mistakes 
or investigators set up sophisticated traps 
to harvest passwords and personal data. In 
the case of Hansa it was a property search 
that allowed investigators to gain access to 
the administrator’s encrypted laptop. 
Alternatively, smartphone PINs could be 
acquired visually as they are entered. Such 
methods would grant the state legitimate 
access to encrypted communication by 
criminals without reducing cyber-security 
for the population as a whole. 
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